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Statutory Interpretation, Administrative
Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis
Randy J. Kozel*
This Article examines three facets of the relationship between statutory
interpretation and the law of stare decisis: judicial interpretation, administrative
interpretation, and interpretive methodology.
In analyzing these issues, I emphasize the role of stare decisis in pursuing
balance between past and present. That role admits of no distinction between
statutory and constitutional decisions, calling into question the practice of giving
elevated deference to judicial interpretations of statutes. The pursuit of balance
also suggests that one Supreme Court cannot bind future Justices to a wideranging interpretive methodology. As for rules requiring deference to
administrative interpretations of statutes and regulations, they are articulated at
high levels of generality, cut across numerous contexts, and dictate the
inferences that future Justices must draw from congressional and administrative
ambiguity. Taken in combination, these factors give rise to a strong argument
that administrative-deference regimes like the Chevron and Auer doctrines fall
outside the bounds of stare decisis.

Introduction
Statutory interpretation isn’t always a clean slate. Courts are commonly
asked to revisit or revise statutory provisions they previously encountered.
Those requests implicate the doctrine of stare decisis.
Applying principles of horizontal stare decisis to the domain of statutes
raises a number of complicated questions for judges. One is how to treat prior
judicial interpretations of particular statutory provisions. Another is how to
treat the methodologies that led to those interpretations. A third is how to
treat interpretations by administrative agencies.
The Supreme Court has left no doubt that specific interpretations of
statutory provisions receive a unique, elevated form of deference going
forward. It has said less about the stare decisis implications of interpretive
methodologies. And the rules for judicial review of administrative
* Diane and M.O. Miller II Research Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty
Development, Notre Dame Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, thanks to Akhil
Amar, Samuel Bray, Emily Bremer, Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, Nicole Garnett, Brent Murphy, Aaron
Nielson, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Richard Re, Chas Tyler, Christopher Walker, and workshop
participants at Columbia Law School, the University of Florida College of Law, Michigan State
University Law School, Notre Dame Law School, and Antonin Scalia Law School. The latter
workshop was a roundtable on New Normals hosted by the C. Boyden Gray Center for the Study of
the Administrative State, and the author received a stipend for his participation. Elias Ayoub
provided excellent research assistance.
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interpretations create uncertainty given their unique nature: Those rules are
not limited to any particular statute, but neither do they sweep as widely as
wholesale methodologies of statutory interpretation. If the Justices part ways
on the soundness of certain administrative-deference rules—and there is
evidence that they do—it is debatable what role the doctrine of stare decisis
should play.
This Article examines the operation of stare decisis across specific
interpretations, general methodologies, and administrative-deference
regimes. Thinking about the three problems together illuminates a common
theme: the function of precedent in striking a balance between past and
present. Stare decisis enhances the continuity of legal rules. It calls upon
individual Justices to remain cognizant of their membership in an enduring
institution with a history that predates them and a future that will extend
beyond their tenure. That awareness sometimes leads Justices to stand by
prior opinions they might have resolved differently in the first instance.
At the same time, fidelity to precedent is not absolute. The doctrine of
stare decisis recognizes the possibility that today’s Justices might deviate
from the Supreme Court’s established precedents. History and practice
should not be taken lightly, but today’s Justices must have space to exercise
their own judgment. The goal is balance.
This framing can help us think through some of the most vexing
questions at the intersection of stare decisis and statutory interpretation. To
begin with the Supreme Court’s practice of according elevated deference to
its interpretations of specific statutory provisions, the abiding tension
between past and present suggests that the Court’s current approach ought to
be reconsidered. The problem is not the threshold decision to defer to such
interpretations. The problem, rather, is the practice of giving the
interpretation of statutes heightened deference relative to other judicial
decisions, such as constitutional rulings.1 A system of stare decisis respects
the prerogatives of sitting Justices while allowing the law to maintain its basic

1. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“[S]tare decisis
carries enhanced force when a decision . . . interprets a statute.”); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
235 (1997) (noting that stare decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because
our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior
decisions”). I will focus on the distinction between statutory and constitutional precedents. There is
also a third category of common law precedents, which leading commentators have described as
receiving an intermediate degree of deference somewhere between that given to statutory and
constitutional decisions. See BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT
334–35 (2016); Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 321 (2005); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76
GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362–64 (1988).
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shape despite personnel shifts.2 This rationale is general, applying in like
fashion to statutory and constitutional cases. It reflects an integrated approach
in which all precedents are entitled to meaningful deference and overruling
always requires a “special justification.”3 Whether applied to statutory
decisions or other cases, stare decisis draws together Justices across time
notwithstanding their disagreements. By deferring to precedent, today’s
Justices validate the Supreme Court’s institutional identity.
Existing stare decisis jurisprudence is consistent with this account in
some respects. The Court regularly talks about the doctrine’s conceptual
underpinnings in general terms without separating the statutory and
constitutional contexts. Still, the Court has held fast to the doctrinal divide:
enhanced deference for statutory decisions and reduced deference for
constitutional ones. Some of the Court’s justifications emphasize the unique
dynamics of statutory interpretation. Others work in reverse, positing that the
nature of constitutional adjudication lends itself to a relatively weak form of
deference and that statutory decisions receive more respect by comparison.
But each of these justifications has its shortcomings, and it is worth
reconsidering whether there is sufficient cause for singling out statutory
interpretations and giving them their own, unique brand of deference—
particularly if one believes that the most important functions of precedent
generalize across contexts.
As we move from specific interpretations of statutes to the
methodologies that yield them, we confront a different set of challenges.
Interpretive methodologies do not receive stare decisis effect from the
Supreme Court. It doesn’t have to be this way; some states appear to treat
methodologies as implicating the doctrine of stare decisis. As a normative
matter, I will suggest that interpretive methodologies should not carry
precedential effect at the Supreme Court.4 The doctrine of stare decisis calls
upon the Justices to consider their own interpretive tendencies in tandem with
the Court’s institutional history. Yet room for the individual must remain.
Asking a Justice to give presumptive fidelity to a wide-ranging methodology
with which she disagrees is asking too much. Today’s Court cannot tell
tomorrow’s Court that it must (or must not) consult legislative history in
2. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 103 (2001) (“Stare
decisis . . . furnishes a functionally crucial response to the phenomenon of reasonable
disagreement.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91 TEXAS L.
REV. 1711, 1737 (2013) (“The doctrine [of stare decisis] enables a reasoned conversation over time
between justices—and others—who subscribe to competing methodologies of constitutional
interpretation.”).
3. E.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409; Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
4. This Article considers the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of its own precedents pursuant to
the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis. The operation of vertical stare decisis, which relates to a
superior court’s ability to constrain inferior courts, is a separate matter.
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interpreting a statute the Justices have never considered, any more than
today’s Court can tell tomorrow’s Court that it must (or must not) consult
The Federalist in resolving a novel constitutional dispute.5
The conceptual space between specific interpretations and general
methodologies is where we find the rules of engagement for judicial review
of administrative interpretations. A prominent example is the Chevron
doctrine, pursuant to which an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous
statute that it administers is lawful so long as it is reasonable.6 Another is the
Auer doctrine, which takes a deferential approach toward an agency’s
interpretation of the regulations it has crafted in the course of implementing
Congress’s statutory directives.7 In 2015, Justice Thomas wondered whether
administrative-deference regimes should be “classified as interpretive tools”
that lack stare decisis effect.8 The Court has not yet resolved the matter.
There are difficulties with treating administrative-deference regimes as
implicating the doctrine of stare decisis. Deference regimes bear little
resemblance to the specific interpretations of particular provisions at the
doctrine’s core. Though such regimes are not as capacious as wholesale
interpretive methodologies, they are articulated at high levels of abstraction
and apply across a wide range of cases and contexts. What is more, they
dictate particular interpretive choices on behalf of today’s Court. A Justice
applying Chevron is told which inference to draw from legislative silence on
a matter encompassed within the statute under consideration: she must
conclude that Congress intended to give the agency the power to fill the gap.
Likewise, a Justice applying Auer is told which inferences she may draw in
the face of regulatory ambiguity—for example, that the correct interpretation

5. Cf. State v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 520 (Iowa 2014) (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (“Actual
decisions are binding and can have stare decisis effect, but is a philosophical approach binding? . . .
Could four Justices of the Supreme Court bind this court in the future to follow ‘original intent,’
‘legal realism,’ or ‘economic analysis of the law’? I doubt it.”).
6. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (“[I]f the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” (footnote omitted)). The
Court addressed the scope of Chevron in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). See
Kevin M. Stack, The Interpretive Dimension of Seminole Rock, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 670
(2015) (“In Mead, the Court constricted the application of Chevron deference to statutes that grant
lawmaking authority to the agency and to agency actions exercising that authority.”).
7. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997). Like Chevron, Auer has some limitations on
its scope. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 n.4 (2015) (“Auer deference is
not an inexorable command in all cases.”).
8. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1214 n.1 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing
CALEB E. NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 701 (2011)); cf. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 486 (2014) (contending that “on a question as important as
administrative law, judges cannot simply cite their prior cases, but must pause to consider what they
are doing”).
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of the regulation is the one the agency now favors, even if the Justice reads
the regulation differently.
This combination of (a) breadth and (b) compulsion of interpretive
choice goes too far in asking the individual Justice to subordinate her
authority to the Court’s institutional past. The consequence, I will contend,
is that administrative-deference regimes like Chevron and Auer are not
entitled to stare decisis effect, at least as those regimes are presently justified
in the Court’s jurisprudence. This is not to say that Chevron or Auer should
be abandoned. The stare decisis analysis does not determine whether rules in
the spirit of Chevron and Auer are sound on the merits, nor does it predict
how the law would operate if Chevron or Auer were rejected or revised.9
Moreover, even if Chevron and Auer were not entitled to stare decisis effect,
we might nevertheless expect many lower courts to follow them—a point that
matters immensely given the Supreme Court’s limited capacity to hear and
decide cases.10 Lower courts might agree with those regimes on the merits,
or they might accept them because they enjoy currency at the Supreme Court
even if they are not entitled to deference as a formal matter.11 I take no
position on such possibilities. I simply question whether a Justice ought to
feel compelled to follow Chevron or Auer if she has concerns about those
approaches on the merits.12

9. Cf. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 184 (2006) [hereinafter VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY]
(defending a “second-order default rule that agencies rather than judges will be allowed to choose
the interpretive default rules, such as the canons of construction, unless statutes clearly say
otherwise”); ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 31 (2016) [hereinafter VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION] (“[S]upposing
Chevron to be overruled tomorrow, in all likelihood nothing of substance would change.”); Jeffrey
A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2016) (“The shift from deference
to de novo may be a marginal one measured against the actual amount of interpretive deference
occurring today.”).
10. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court’s Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1095
(1987) (“The Court not only expects the lower courts to vary in their judgments, but also knows that
it may not reach these unresolved conflicts for years, until they have proved their importance.”);
Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 103, 121 (2018) (“[W]hen assessing the impact of deference doctrines on judicial
behavior, the federal courts of appeals are the more appropriate focus. After all, these circuit courts
review the vast majority of statutory interpretations advanced by agencies . . . .”).
11. Lower federal courts sometimes defer to statements from Supreme Court opinions even
while recognizing those statements as dicta. RANDY J. KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY
OF PRECEDENT 81–82 (2017). For more on the impact of methodological precedent in the lower
courts, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, What Would It Mean to Have Methodological Precedent (And
Do We Already Have It)? (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
12. If one were unpersuaded by my analysis, the appropriate course presumably would be to
apply the Court’s established doctrine of stare decisis. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law,
107 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
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This Article begins in Part I by analyzing the stare decisis effect of
judicial interpretations of particular statutory provisions. Part II moves from
interpretations to methodologies, which raise unique questions for the
doctrine of stare decisis. In Part III, the Article turns to administrative
interpretations of statutes and related regulations. Across all three Parts, I
draw on a vision of precedent as a bridge between Justices and a mechanism
for accommodating the present and past.
I.

Judicial Interpretations

Judicial interpretations of federal statutes receive more insulation from
overruling than do other types of precedents. As a recent study observes,
“[s]tare decisis applies with special force to questions of statutory
construction.”13
Though the unique status of statutory precedent is well established under
existing law, the justifications for elevated stare decisis remain subject to
debate. As we will see, some of the assumptions underlying the distinction
between statutory and constitutional decisions are questionable, and the
distinction has been described as lacking the historical pedigree of other
components of the doctrine of stare decisis.14 In addition, there are claims
that the distinction actually has little explanatory force in determining
whether a precedent will be overruled.15 Even so, the statutory/constitutional
divide is a salient feature of the modern law as described by the Supreme
Court.16
Stare decisis means something different in statutory cases, and a
decision’s statutory nature has a prominent place in the Supreme Court’s
discussions. But the theoretical foundations of stare decisis keep the same
shape across the statutory and constitutional contexts.

=3225880## [https://perma.cc/3GNE-ZCVR] (concluding that the argument for overruling Chevron
is relatively weak).
13. GARNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 333. For a recent argument that this practice should be
reconsidered with respect to statutory precedents that “amount to gap-filling exercises” in judicial
implementation, see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV.
157, 216 (2018).
14. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 735 (1999) (arguing that “[t]he notion that the
constitutional or statutory nature of a precedent affects its susceptibility to reversal was largely
rejected in the founding era and did not gain majority support until well into the twentieth century”).
15. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Adam Liptak, The Decision to Depart (or Not) from
Constitutional Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1146
(2015) (challenging the significance of the statutory/constitutional distinction in recent Supreme
Court cases).
16. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
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Areas of Conceptual Convergence

1. Justifications.—Despite the Supreme Court’s singling out of statutory
interpretations for special treatment, its opinions commonly recite broader
principles of stare decisis that cut across contexts. For example, in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union,17 the Court considered the meaning of a civil rights
statute, 41 U.S.C. § 1981, as applied to racial harassment in employment.
One question was whether § 1981 extends to private conduct at all. The Court
had answered in the affirmative thirteen years earlier.18 In Patterson, the
Court stood by its precedent on grounds of stare decisis.19
The Patterson Court noted that “[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have
special force in the area of statutory interpretation.”20 That statement
unmistakably recognizes a distinction between statutory and constitutional
cases. Yet much of the Court’s discussion of stare decisis was framed in
general terms. It described the doctrine as “a basic self-governing principle
within the Judicial Branch” and invoked Hamilton’s statement about the
importance of precedent in fending off the exercise of “an arbitrary
discretion.”21 The Court also drew on a recent decision for the overarching
proposition that stare decisis “ensures that ‘the law will not merely change
erratically’ and ‘permits society to presume that bedrock principles are
founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals.’”22 While the
statutory context certainly mattered in bumping up the force of stare decisis,
the Court presented a unified account of the doctrine’s foundations.
To similar effect is Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC,23 decided in
2015. That case dealt with the application of the patent laws to royalty
agreements. As in Patterson, the Court stood by its precedent despite a
request to depart.24 The Court noted that stare decisis “carries enhanced force
when a decision . . . interprets a statute.”25 Once again, though, the Court
framed its discussion more broadly. Among its citations was a constitutional
case, Payne v. Tennessee,26 which Kimble quoted in affirming that stare
decisis “‘promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development
of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
1888)).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

491 U.S. 164 (1989).
See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172–75.
Id. at 172.
Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Lodge ed.,
Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)).
135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
See id. at 2406.
Id. at 2409.
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.’”27 Likewise, before
it discussed the “enhanced force” of statutory precedents, Kimble explained
in general terms that “an argument that we got something wrong—even a
good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify scrapping settled
precedent.”28
Cases like Patterson and Kimble complicate the conventional depiction
of the relationship between statutory and constitutional precedents. The
Supreme Court continues to note that its interpretations of statutes are entitled
to more deference than other types of decisions. At the same time, the Court’s
discussions of stare decisis do not treat the two categories as sealed off from
one another. Though there remains a doctrinal divide, there is a notable
amount of conceptual convergence.
Convergence also occurs in decisions that end up departing from
precedent. A good example is Hubbard v. United States,29 involving the
federal false statement law. A Supreme Court decision from 1955 reasoned
that the law extends even to statements made to courts.30 Four decades later,
the Court described that interpretation as “seriously flawed.”31 The question
was what role stare decisis would play. Writing for a plurality, Justice
Stevens noted that deference to precedent is strongest in the statutory
context.32 But he drew on broader principles as well. He reasoned that
“[a]dherence to precedent . . . serves an indispensable institutional role
within the Federal Judiciary,” and he echoed the Court’s prior description of
stare decisis as a fundamental part of how the judiciary operates, citing
Patterson as well as the Court’s constitutional ruling in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.33 Deference to precedent is never
absolute, and Justice Stevens saw Hubbard as presenting the exceptional
situation in which an overruling is justified.34 Nevertheless, the bases of stare
decisis applied across contexts.
Some reasons for deferring to precedent involve the mechanics of
litigation, such as the argument that it would be costly and inefficient to
require de novo consideration of every legal question.35 Respect for precedent
27. Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 827–28).
28. Id.
29. 514 U.S. 695 (1995).
30. United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955).
31. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 702.
32. Id. at 711 (plurality opinion).
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. Hubbard, 514 U.S. at 713.
35. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921) (“[T]he
labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be
reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation
of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.”).
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helps judges economize on decision costs and saves litigants from the hassle
and expense of arguing matters that are well settled. Other defenses of stare
decisis revolve around judicial humility and the possibility that today’s
Justices may be mistaken in their diagnoses of past error.36 That prospect
counsels caution before departing from what has gone before.
There are also considerations of predictability and reliance. If people
feel the ground shifting beneath their feet, they may be reluctant to act—or,
alternatively, they may act in ways that are subsequently undermined.37 Stare
decisis allows people to plan their affairs with added confidence in the legal
backdrop. One might respond that there are no sure bets in life, so when
people act based on the existing web of legal rules, they should account for
the possibility that those rules may change.38 But the Supreme Court has
taken a different tack. It has accepted the importance of protecting reliance,
albeit while recognizing that countervailing interests sometimes require
departures from precedent.39 The goal is not simply to encourage people to
rely on the law going forward; it is also to protect people who have relied on
the law in the past.40 On this understanding, the law possesses an enduring
essence that society properly perceives as stable. Solicitude for reliance
expectations does double duty: it identifies a set of interests that the Supreme
Court views as important, and it offers lessons about the Court’s conception
of the law.

36. See Deborah Hellman, An Epistemic Defense of Precedent (discussing the epistemic
argument for a rule of deference to prior decisions), in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 63, 66 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013).
37. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (noting that stare decisis “fosters reliance
on judicial decisions”).
38. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 49 (noting the argument that stakeholders should take
precautions against overrulings); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May
Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1554 (2000)
(reasoning that prudent actors should “discount” their reliance based on the possibility of legal
change).
39. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007)
(concluding that while “reliance on a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it,” in the
case at hand “[r]eliance interests do not require us to reaffirm” the relevant precedent); cf. Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349 (2009) (“The fact that the law enforcement community may view the
State’s version of [the rule embodied in the relevant precedent] as an entitlement does not establish
the sort of reliance interest that could outweigh the countervailing interest that all individuals share
in having their constitutional rights fully protected.”).
40. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015) (“So long as we see a
reasonable possibility that parties have structured their business transactions in light of [the relevant
precedent], we have one more reason to let it stand.”); Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716
(1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“The doctrine of stare decisis
protects the legitimate expectations of those who live under the law . . . .”); Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (“The inquiry into reliance counts the cost of a rule’s
repudiation as it would fall on those who have relied reasonably on the rule’s continued
application.”).
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None of these justifications is context-dependent. Fidelity to statutory
and constitutional decisions alike can create efficiencies, protect reliance
expectations, urge caution against hasty departures, and imbue the law with
added stability and predictability. That does not mean precedents of either
type are beyond reconsideration. The lesson, rather, is that the core of stare
decisis is general in its operation and impact.
2. Unifying Function.—When they interpret statutes, Supreme Court
Justices exhibit a range of methodological tendencies. In Part II, I will discuss
the extent to which methodologies are entitled to stare decisis effect. Before
reaching that discussion, I consider the distinct question of how
methodological disagreements affect the deference owed to particular
interpretations of statutory provisions.
It is unremarkable that two Justices with different methodological
preferences might sometimes reach different conclusions about whether a
prior interpretation was correct. Fidelity to precedent allows the law to
maintain its stability notwithstanding those methodological divergences.
Yesterday’s decisions retain their claim to respect even if today’s Justices
harbor doubts about the decisions’ animating methodologies. By
emphasizing the Court’s nature as a continuous institution rather than a
shifting assemblage of individuals, stare decisis supports a conception of
judging as “a collective project to develop and elucidate the law.”41 That is
what gives the doctrine its “fundamental importance to the rule of law.”42
Rather than allowing the law to ebb and flow with personnel shifts and
attendant shifts in prevailing interpretive philosophies, stare decisis pursues
continuity in the face of change. In the realm of statutory interpretation, the
purposivist Justice is asked to give presumptive deference to the decisions of
her more textualist predecessors.43 The textualist Justice is asked to do the
same with respect to more purposivist interpretations. The aspiration is to
smooth out the path of the law even as the composition of the Court changes.
A shared commitment to precedent also gives today’s Justices something to
work with when their respective methodologies point them in different
directions. Respect for prior decisions facilitates cooperative and deliberative
decision-making notwithstanding the reality of philosophical disagreement.44

41. Paul J. Watford, Richard C. Chen & Marco Basile, Crafting Precedent, 131 HARV. L. REV.
543, 549 (2017) (book review); see also Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A
Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 (2012) (arguing that a later judge “should think of
himself not as an individual charged with deciding cases but as a member of a court”).
42. Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987).
43. On the distinction between textualism and purposivism, see infra Part II.
44. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 107 (articulating a theory of precedent designed to “facilitate[]
coordinated action among justices who are inclined to view the world differently”); cf. CASS R.
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This dynamic is not unique to the statutory context; it arises in
constitutional cases as well. There are philosophical differences between
those who emphasize the original meaning of the Constitution and those who
view constitutional principles as informed by contemporary norms and
values.45 Even as these (and other) methodologies compete for primacy at the
Court, a shared commitment to precedent fosters stability in constitutional
jurisprudence. To limit vacillation, the Justices presumptively defer to what
has come before, whether or not a prior decision embodies the interpretive
methodology that currently prevails at the Court. In doing so, they ensure that
constitutional principles are “more than what five Justices say” they are.46
The role of stare decisis as a source of constraint, stability, and
impersonality does not depend on whether a precedent involves the
interpretation of a statute or a constitutional provision. Whether in the
statutory or constitutional context, deference to precedent underscores the
Supreme Court’s status as a stable institution notwithstanding the various
interpretive tendencies of individual Justices. Each Justice has an important
role to play, but she is called upon to recognize the Court to which she
belongs as an enduring body with a history that preceded her and a future that
will carry forward indefinitely. That makes it imperative to render decisions
with an eye toward continuity in order to promote the notion of the Court,
and the law, as transcending the moment.47 This focus on continuity suggests
not a stratified approach to precedent, but rather a unified one in which
decisions receive meaningful deference no matter their context.48
3. Doctrinal Composition.—Just as the core justifications and functions
of stare decisis hold their shape across decisional contexts, so do the

SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 4–5 (1999)
(noting the connection between respect for precedent and the challenge of resolving difficult issues).
45. Lawrence Solum describes originalism as defined by the belief that the “communicative
content of the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified,” and that
“constitutional practice should be constrained by that communicative content of the text.”
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 269 (2017). By comparison,
David Strauss defines a living constitution as “one that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to
new circumstances, without being formally amended.” DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION 1 (2010).
46. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281,
288 (1990); see also CARDOZO, supra note 35, at 150 (“The situation would . . . be intolerable if the
weekly changes in the composition of the court were accompanied by changes in its rulings.”); cf.
Allison Orr Larsen, Supreme Court Norms of Impersonality, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 373 (2018).
47. See Waldron, supra note 41, at 21 (arguing that judges across time share the responsibility
of “seeing that cases that come before the court are decided on the basis of the rule of law”).
48. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“[A]n argument
that we got something wrong—even a good argument to that effect—cannot by itself justify
scrapping settled precedent.”).
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considerations that affect whether a precedent is retained or overruled. The
Supreme Court has made clear that deference to precedent is not “an
inexorable command.”49 A variety of factors have emerged to guide the
inquiry into whether the presumption of deference is rebutted in a particular
case. They include whether the precedent’s logic has been undermined by
subsequent developments and whether its rule has been unworkable as a
procedural matter. On the other side of the scale are considerations like
whether the precedent has generated significant reliance interests that might
warrant its retention. These factors are not context-dependent. They appear
in the Court’s discussions of stare decisis in statutory cases and constitutional
cases alike.50
B.

Areas of Conceptual Distinction
1. Prospect of Override.—Enacting a statute is not easy. But it is easier
than amending the Constitution. In the statutory realm, “Congress remains
free to alter what” the Supreme Court has done.51 In the constitutional
context, by contrast, popular revision of the Court’s judgments is commonly
deemed to be a nonstarter. For the Article V amendment process to get off
the ground, there must be a proposal endorsed by two-thirds of both houses
of Congress or a call for a convention by two-thirds of the states.52 And
ratification of an amendment requires three-fourths of the states to approve.53
That degree of consensus, the argument goes, is too much to expect.
Short of the amendment process, Congress lacks authority to override the
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions. Justice Brandeis made the point
nearly a century ago, arguing that “in cases involving the Federal
Constitution . . . correction through legislative action is practically
impossible.”54 Decades later, the Court echoed this statement in noting that
stare decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our

49. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991).
50. See, e.g., Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410–11 (noting that the relevant precedent’s “statutory and
doctrinal underpinnings have not eroded over time” and that “nothing about [the relevant precedent]
has proved unworkable”); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
900–07 (2007) (discussing factors such as whether a precedent has been undermined by subsequent
cases and its impact on reliance interests); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485
U.S. 271, 283 (1988) (discussing whether the rule derived from a precedent was “unsound in theory,
unworkable and arbitrary in practice, and unnecessary to achieve any legitimate goals”); cf. Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (noting the relevance of workability,
reliance implications, subsequent developments in the law, and factual changes).
51. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
52. U.S. CONST. art. V.
53. Id.
54. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by
overruling our prior decisions.”55
At the outset, it is worth noting that legislatures sometimes have the
ability to respond effectively to the Supreme Court’s constitutional edicts.56
Imagine, for example, that the Court had declined in 2010 to recognize a First
Amendment right on behalf of corporations and labor unions to advocate for
political candidates.57 There would have been nothing to prevent Congress
and the states from allowing those organizations to engage in candidate
advocacy irrespective of the Court’s decision.58 This is emblematic of a
broader category of cases in which the Court decides that the Constitution
does not guarantee an asserted right or liberty. In many such cases,
legislatures possess the power to respond through subconstitutional legal
protections.59 Legislative protections are not perfect substitutes for
constitutional rights, of course. Nevertheless, in some situations Congress
and the states have significant authority to shape the practical implications of
the Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions.60 It is not always true that
“correction through legislative action is practically impossible.”61 Even if one
assumes that the Article V amendment process is too cumbersome to present
a viable option in many cases, there will be situations in which legislation
can plug a gap left by an incorrect constitutional ruling.
As for the remaining cases in which the legislature has no effective
response to a flawed constitutional ruling, it is debatable whether the effect
should be to reduce the potency of stare decisis. The difficulty of amending
the Constitution might be something for the judiciary to emulate rather than
alleviate. That is, Article V can be read to imply the importance of stability
in the path of constitutional law, creating a meaningful presumption of
continuity in the face of not only popular reconsideration via the amendment

55. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). The Court recently reiterated this point in
Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2478 (2018).
56. See Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547, 594
(2018) (discussing the protection of rights through legislation following judicial decisions).
57. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
58. Cf. id. at 357 (“Indeed, 26 States do not restrict independent expenditures by for-profit
corporations.”).
59. Cf. Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1437, 1443 (2007) (distinguishing between situations where the Supreme Court intervenes
and where it fails to intervene).
60. For a recent rejection of the argument that Congress’s power to respond to a flawed
constitutional decision should dissuade the Supreme Court from overruling it, see South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096–97 (2018) (“It is inconsistent with this Court’s proper role to
ask Congress to address a false constitutional premise of this Court’s own creation.”).
61. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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process, but judicial reconsideration as well.62 If that argument holds, we lose
another rationale for giving more deference to statutory precedents than
constitutional ones.
2. Inferences from Legislative Behavior.—Beyond arguments about the
viability of various mechanisms of legal change, other defenses of elevated
stare decisis for statutory interpretations depend on inferences about
congressional intent.
a. Legislative Acquiescence.—The Supreme Court interprets a statute.
Some are pleased, some are chagrined, and the world keeps turning.
Everyone understands that Congress, if it so desired, could enact new
legislation that overrides the Court’s interpretation. But Congress declines to
do so. Maybe it takes no action at all. Or maybe it introduces responsive
legislation but never follows through by passing it.63 In either scenario, there
is an argument that Congress’s failure to act should be viewed as tantamount
to acceptance of the Court’s construction, and the Court should resist calls to
reconsider its decision now that Congress has tacitly signed off. This is the
“legislative acquiescence” rationale for elevated statutory stare decisis.64
The Supreme Court’s approach to legislative acquiescence has not been
entirely consistent, and the Court’s jurisprudence reflects some skepticism of
the view that failure to alter a statute carries the imprimatur of legislative
approval.65 A good illustration is Helvering v. Hallock,66 which considered
the taxation of trust property. There, the Court declined to view the “want of
specific Congressional repudiations” as “an implied instruction by Congress
to us not to reconsider” the Court’s prior interpretation.67 It resisted trying to
“explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds no

62. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 422, 430 (1988) (“The observation that it is hard to amend the Constitution does not imply
that judges should revise their work more freely.”).
63. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972) (“Remedial legislation has been introduced
repeatedly in Congress but none has ever been enacted. . . .”).
64. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1367 (describing the argument that “tacit congressional approval
allegedly raises the normal presumption of a precedent’s correctness to the super-strong
presumption for most statutory precedents”).
65. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 347 (“Courts generally don’t ‘draw inferences of
approval from the unexplained inaction of [the legislature].’” (quoting United States v. Bd. of
Comm’rs of Sheffield, 435 U.S. 110, 135 (1978))); Lee, supra note 14, at 705 (“The nature of the
inference from congressional inaction has varied over the years . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
66. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
67. Id. at 119.
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light.”68 In other cases, however, inferences from congressional inaction play
a significant role in justifying the Court’s choice to stay the course.69
One problem with the acquiescence argument relates to changes in
legislative bodies over time. Even if congressional inaction sometimes
amounts to a stamp of approval, it is not obvious that the Court should rely
on what today’s legislators think about the meaning of a law enacted by a
previous Congress. Justice Scalia pressed the point in one of his early
dissents. He noted that the proper referent in evaluating “the correctness of
statutory construction” is “what the law as enacted meant,” not “what the
current Congress desires.”70 On that logic, congressional failure to revise a
statute reveals nothing about the sort of intent that matters.
This view assumes that the meaning of a statute remains static from the
time of its enactment. If one believes instead that the meaning of statutes
tends to change over time, the acquiescence argument fares no better. From
that perspective, the touchstone is not what the statute meant upon its
enactment, but rather what it means today, as informed by factors including
contemporary “societal or legal context.”71 Congressional inaction is no more
revealing on this score than it is in revealing whether judicial interpretations
are consistent with a statute’s meaning as originally enacted. Moreover,
clinging too tightly to prior interpretations might prevent judges from being
open to the sort of updating that is important for some dynamic approaches
to statutory interpretation.72
Further challenges arise from the nature of the legislative process,
whose various barriers and requirements complicate attempts to equate
“congressional failure to act” with “approval of the status quo.”73 The
alternative explanations for inaction are legion: There might have been a
widespread belief within Congress that the status quo should be altered but

68. Id. at 119–20; Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 186 (1994) (“[O]ur observations on the acquiescence doctrine indicate its limitations as
an expression of congressional intent.”).
69. See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008) (“Congress
has long acquiesced in the interpretation we have given.”); Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 187
(“It is true that our cases have not been consistent in rejecting arguments [based on congressional
silence].”).
70. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cty., 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); see also Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 427 (“If the purpose of statutory construction is
to carry out the decisions of the enacting body, the quiescence of a later body does not reflect at all
on the propriety of the interpretation.”).
71. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481
(1987).
72. See id. at 1544 (“Of course, prior statutory precedents should normally be upheld, based
upon the same precepts of stare decisis that apply to common law precedents; they should simply
not be given any greater deference than is necessary.”).
73. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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disagreement about how to do it. Congress might not have paid much
attention to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the statute in question. Or
it might have known about the interpretations but not cared much one way or
another.74 At the end of the day, Justice Scalia noted, “vindication by
congressional inaction” is really just “a canard.”75 As Hart and Sacks observe,
the “reasons which legislators may have either for opposing a bill or simply
withholding the votes necessary for its forward progress” include everything
from “[c]omplete disinterest” to “[b]elief that the bill is sound in principle
but defective in material particulars” to “[e]tc., etc., etc., etc., etc.”76
None of this is to deny that in any given case, Congress’s failure to act
might owe in part to agreement with the way in which the Supreme Court has
interpreted a statute—though that would leave the question whether approval
by today’s Congress should matter to the status of yesterday’s law. In any
event, there are always alternative explanations for legislative inaction, and
the Court will seldom have the information necessary to determine which
type of situation it is confronting.
b. Legislative Reenactment.—Sometimes Congress reenacts a statutory
scheme that the Supreme Court previously considered.77 Such action might
suggest that Congress intended to endorse the Court’s reading of any
provisions that it left unchanged,78 and that the Court should not deviate from
its prior interpretation now that Congress has signified its approval and
assent.
An example of the reenactment argument in action comes from Bank of
America Corp. v. City of Miami,79 which dealt with allegations of racial
discrimination in mortgage lending. The City of Miami sued under the Fair
Housing Act, and the Supreme Court ultimately determined that the City was
an “aggrieved person” as the Act defines that term.80 In reaching its
conclusion, the Court noted that it had a track record of broadly defining the
universe of persons who can file lawsuits under the Act. When Congress
amended the Act in 1988, it effectively retained the preexisting definition of
aggrieved persons—the same definition the Court had construed broadly. The

74. See id.; Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 427.
75. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 672 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
76. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1359 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
77. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017).
78. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 1, at 346 (describing the structure of arguments based on
reenactment).
79. 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
80. Id. at 1301; see also 42 U.S.C. § 3602(i) (2012).
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Bank of America Court was persuaded that “Congress ‘was aware of’ our
precedent and ‘made a considered judgment to retain the relevant statutory
text.’”81 The Court concluded that “principles of statutory interpretation
require us to respect Congress’ decision to ratify [the relevant] precedents.”82
Given the reenactment, there was no basis for the Court to reconsider its prior
approach.83
The Court grappled with related issues in Kimble v. Marvel
Entertainment, LLC. The question was whether a patentholder may charge
royalties after a patent term expires.84 In 1964, the Court said no in a case
called Brulotte.85 The Kimble Court noted that despite having revised the
patent laws numerous times in the intervening years, Congress never saw fit
to reject the Brulotte rule.86 Writing for himself and two others, Justice Alito
challenged the majority’s application of stare decisis. He rejected the
inference that “Congress’ failure to act shows that it approves” a prior
decision.87 Because “[p]assing legislation is no easy task,” there are
explanations aside from legislative approval for why Congress may have
allowed a judicial interpretation to remain operative.88 For Justice Alito, the
Kimble majority put “too much weight on Congress’ failure to overturn
Brulotte.”89
Reenactment arguments often seem stronger than arguments based
purely on acquiescence. After all, reenactment means Congress actually did
something. Still, there are difficulties with drawing inferences about
congressional intent from reenactment. Some of the difficulties run parallel
to those raised by arguments from acquiescence: Congress might have
reenacted a statute but not thought much about the specific provision in
question, devoting its attention and political capital to other matters. In those
circumstances, treating the Court’s prior construction as conclusive would be
unwarranted. Or there might have been widespread agreement about the need
to reenact legislation but competing views of how to handle a particular issue
the Court previously addressed, with the reenactment reflecting a choice to
81. Bank of America, 137 S. Ct. at 1303–04 (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v.
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2519 (2015)).
82. Id. at 1305.
83. See id. at 1304–05; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87
MICH. L. REV. 67, 79 (1988) (discussing the Supreme Court’s acceptance of certain reenactment
arguments).
84. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2405 (2015).
85. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33–34 (1964).
86. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2410 (“Congress’s continual reworking of the patent laws—but
never of the Brulotte rule—further supports leaving the decision in place.”).
87. Id. at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 2418–19.
89. Id. at 2418.
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put those disagreements aside in pursuit of other goals.90 As a structural
matter, it is also worth considering whether the Supreme Court may
effectively forbid Congress to reenact a statute unless it is prepared to take a
stand, explicitly or implicitly, on every prior interpretation of the statute
contained in the Court’s caselaw.91 The reenactment argument thus requires
a leap—just not as long a leap as the acquiescence argument.
3. Galvanizing Congressional Action and Cabining the Judicial Role.—
So far, I have challenged defenses of elevated statutory stare decisis that are
grounded in the relative ease of revising statutes or the implications of
congressional acquiescence or reenactment. Another possible justification
for heightened deference to statutory decisions draws on the respective roles
of the legislature and the judiciary in the democratic process.
We might think of the rules of precedent as galvanizing continued
legislative participation in reviewing and revising statutory schemes—and,
at the same time, as limiting the role of the judiciary. Consider Lawrence
Marshall’s defense of an unflinching doctrine of statutory stare decisis
designed to “let Congress know that it, and only it, is responsible for
reviewing the [Supreme] Court’s statutory decisions.”92 The goal is to limit
the judiciary’s participation in the lawmaking process.93 In this respect
Professor Marshall’s reasoning coheres with that of Justice Black, who
invoked the separation of powers in arguing that “[h]aving given our view on
the meaning of a statute, our task is concluded, absent extraordinary
circumstances.”94 To ensure that Congress has every “reason to exercise its
responsibility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair,” the
judiciary should relent after interpreting a statute for the first time.95 Such an

90. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 83, at 107 n.213 (“When Congress reenacts a statute, . . . it has few
incentives to reexamine issues ‘settled’ by Supreme Court decisions.”).
91. See HART & SACKS, supra note 76, at 1367 (challenging the idea that Congress must
commit itself to endorsing prior judicial interpretations by reenacting a statutory provision). If
Congress is deemed to endorse interpretations not only of the Supreme Court but also of other
federal courts, the situation is even more complicated, for it increases the costs to Congress and
assumes legislative awareness of a much larger universe of judicial interpretations. See Barrett,
supra note 1, at 318 (describing different expectations regarding congressional responses to
Supreme Court decisions as compared with decisions from the lower federal courts).
92. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 183 (1989).
93. See id. at 207; cf. Barrett, supra note 1, at 317 (describing the argument that “[b]ecause
statutory interpretation inevitably involves policymaking, it risks infringing upon legislative power,
and consequently, the Supreme Court should approach the task with caution”).
94. Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 258 (1970) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
95. Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284, 296 (1996).
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approach respects both “Congress’ role . . . and the compelling need to
preserve the courts’ limited resources.”96
In one of its formulations, this argument is part of a genre that derives
rules of adjudication from hoped-for effects on congressional behavior.97
Like other arguments within the genre, it faces questions about the ability of
interpretive practices within the courts to affect how Congress goes about its
business.98 Alternatively, it is possible to detach the argument from
assumptions about legislative responses to judicial interpretations. The idea
would be that “courts ought generally to refuse to revisit statutory precedents
regardless of whether their refusal prompts congressional action.”99 On this
account, the appeal of statutory stare decisis is in limiting the judicial role,
irrespective of whether Congress is likely to respond.
This separation-of-powers argument may resonate with those who are
concerned about repeated judicial engagements with a statutory provision. If
one believes instead that judicial reconsideration is as lawful, legitimate, and
consonant with the constitutional scheme as is judicial interpretation in the
first instance, the need for elevated statutory stare decisis diminishes. There
still might be worries about excessive judicial reconsideration and
vacillation, but those worries are not unique to the statutory context. They
reflect the importance of stare decisis as a general matter.
C.

A Word on Common-Law Statutes
The conventional distinction between statutory and constitutional
precedents is subject to an important exception: when the Supreme Court
understands a statute as requiring something akin to common law
development of legal principles, it is more willing to reconsider its prior
interpretation.
The paradigmatic example is the Sherman Act, which prohibits
contracts and agreements “in restraint of trade.”100 The Court has “treated the
Sherman Act as a common-law statute” that must “adapt[] to modern
understanding and greater experience.”101 For purposes of stare decisis, that
entails a reduced level of deference relative to opinions interpreting other

96. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
97. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
2162, 2165 (2002) (discussing canons designed to elicit legislative preferences).
98. Adrian Vermeule adds that such rules require a critical mass of judicial participation in
order to be effective. See VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 223.
99. Barrett, supra note 1, at 348.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
101. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
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statutes.102 For example, when “respected authorities in the economics
literature” suggested that a line of antitrust cases rested on faulty
assumptions, the Court was willing to revise its jurisprudence instead of
waiting for Congress to act103—though not without prompting a response by
Justice Breyer arguing that the customary stare decisis factors counseled
against overruling.104
Common-law statutes like the Sherman Act add further complexity to
the application of stare decisis, for they represent an exception to the principle
that statutory decisions receive elevated deference. They introduce this
complexity despite the fact that the foundations of deference and the factors
that are relevant to a precedent’s overruling are common across domains.
Maybe the Supreme Court should stand by one of its antitrust decisions
despite doubts about that decision on the merits. Or maybe the Court should
treat new evidence or theories about competitive effects as challenging the
decision’s underpinnings and warranting a fresh look. These types of
arguments are familiar features of the law of precedent, irrespective of
context.
The Supreme Court’s current doctrine of stare decisis carves out
statutory decisions for special treatment, then makes an exception to the
exception by relegating common-law statutes back to “ordinary” status. An
alternative is to simplify the doctrine and recognize that no statutory
precedents warrant special status, because precedents from every decisional
context raise related issues involving the role, function, and conceptual
foundations of stare decisis.
***

In sum, the arguments in favor of a stratified doctrine of stare decisis are
contestable. Accepting them requires some combination of assumptions
about legislative attention to Supreme Court edicts, the appropriate
inferences to be drawn from congressional action and inaction, and the
optimal incidence of legal change in both the statutory and constitutional
domains.
Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis rests on general norms, values,
and aspirations. And it is defined by its ability to foster continuity and
impersonality even in the face of interpretive disagreements. That function is
no more important in the statutory context than in the constitutional context.

102. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015) (“This Court
has viewed stare decisis as having less-than-usual force in cases involving the Sherman Act.”); id.
at 2418 (Alito, J., dissenting).
103. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 900.
104. Id. at 929 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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One might wonder whether the argument should go further, foreclosing
the prospect of any deference to erroneous statutory decisions. If a Supreme
Court Justice believes that a given statute is most accurately understood in a
particular way, why should she entertain the option of abiding by a prior
interpretation of the statute that comes out differently? The answer begins
with recognizing each Justice as part of an enduring judicial institution
charged with (among other things) interpreting legislative enactments over
time. A Justice may defer to a prior judicial interpretation, even if she finds
it unconvincing, because it was issued by the Court to which she now
belongs.105 Deference to statutory precedents contributes to legal continuity,
predictability, and impersonality—promoting ideals reflected in the
Constitution’s creation of a judiciary whose members are insulated from
official and electoral control106—and limits the extent to which changes in
prevailing interpretive practices lead to shifting legal rules. Flawed statutory
decisions remain subject to reconsideration in the presence of a “special
justification” beyond disagreement on the merits, just as flawed
constitutional decisions remain subject to reconsideration for similar
reasons.107 Absent such a justification, adherence to statutory precedents
promotes the stability of the law and the institutional identity of the Supreme
Court.
II.

Interpretive Methodologies

The previous Part examined the application of stare decisis to judicial
interpretations of statutes. Under existing law, there is no question that such
interpretations receive some amount of deference, though I have contested
the view that deference to statutory precedents ought to exceed deference to
constitutional precedents.
When we move from interpretations to methodologies, the calculus
changes. If we understand interpretation as the application of a particular
statutory provision to a discrete fact pattern, we can think of methodologies
as residing at the opposite end of the continuum. A methodology does not tell
us what a statute (or other legal source) means. It tells us which processes
105. The fact that Justices may properly defer to prior decisions by the Supreme Court does not
necessarily imply that they may properly defer to decisions by other bodies, such as administrative
agencies. That is a very different debate. Cf. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 218
(2008) (describing the historical roots of the understanding that “the exposition of law belonged to
the office of judgment rather than of will, and whether as to the constitution or other law, the
opinions of the judges in the exercise of their judgment had the authority of their office”).
106. Cf. Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 789
(2017) (arguing that deference to constitutional precedent is consistent with the constitutional
blueprint for reasons including the structure of the judicial office).
107. See generally Randy J. Kozel, Special Justifications, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 471 (2018)
(discussing the requirement of a special justification for overruling precedent).
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and techniques are appropriate in determining that meaning. Prominent
methodologies in the field of statutory interpretation include purposivism,
which focuses on “reading laws to carry out their legislative purpose,”108 and
textualism, which holds that “if the text of the statute is clear, deviation from
the clear import of the text cannot be justified on the ground that it better
promotes fidelity to legislative purposes.”109 To make matters more concrete,
we can also think in terms of specific directives, such as rules governing the
relevance of a statute’s legislative history.110
Asking a Justice to defer to a particular interpretation of a given statute
is very different from asking her to defer to a methodology that sweeps across
contexts and establishes a metarule of legal interpretation.111 My claim in this
Part is that the doctrine of stare decisis should respond in kind.
A.

Methodological Deference and the Goals of Stare Decisis
As we have seen, it is well established that statutory interpretations
receive deference under prevailing principles of stare decisis. The status of
interpretive methodologies is more complicated. In her analysis of the
relationship between precedent and statutory methodology, Abbe Gluck
contends that while methodological stare decisis “appears to be a common
feature of some states’ statutory case law,” it is “generally absent from the
jurisprudence of mainstream federal statutory interpretation.”112 AaronAndrew Bruhl responds that stare decisis is more prevalent than is commonly
appreciated within the federal judiciary, especially in the lower federal
courts.113
My project is not to take sides on this debate, but rather to focus on the
question whether interpretive methodology should receive precedential
effects as a normative matter. To the extent the doctrine is meant to promote
108. John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119.
109. Id. at 124; see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1762–64 (2010)
(comparing textualism and purposivism). There is a great deal of complexity beneath labels like
purposivism and textualism. I use them here simply as illustrative generalities.
110. See Bruhl, supra note 11.
111. Cf. Adam N. Steinman, Case Law, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1947, 2009 (2017) (noting the
argument that methodological rules are distinct because they serve to generate other rules used to
resolve disputes).
112. Gluck, supra note 109, at 1754; see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis
Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863, 1875 (2008) (observing that
the Supreme Court does not give stare decisis effect to statutory methodology); Glen Staszewski,
The Dumbing Down of Statutory Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 209, 218 (2015) (observing that
federal courts generally do not give stare decisis effect to statutory methodology).
113. See Bruhl, supra note 11. For a different approach emphasizing the importance of
“interpretive perspective,” see Stephen M. Rich, A Matter of Perspective: Textualism, Stare Decisis,
and Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1218 (2014).
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continuity, deferring to wide-ranging methodologies would seem to have
considerable appeal. Treating the law of interpretation as settled could add
stability to the legal backdrop.114 And “a consistent approach would increase
predictability and systemic coordination for the many parties involved in
statutory interpretation,” creating additional benefits for Congress, courts,
and individuals.115
Professor Gluck reasons that “[w]ithout a consistent methodology it will
not be possible for litigants (or legislatures) to predict which interpretive
approach will be used in a particular case in the lower courts.”116 The
resulting uncertainty also dilutes the “symbolic, legitimacy-enhancing
benefits” that might otherwise arise from ensuring that judges resolve cases
by reference to established methodological principles.117
In addition, methodological stare decisis could promote the ideal of
impersonality. Given that prevailing interpretive approaches can shift as
judges come and go, it might be better for a court to commit itself to an
interpretive methodology at the institutional level, so as to enhance the
consistency and predictability of judicial techniques as well as case-specific
results.118
On the other hand, methodologies may not implicate individual reliance
interests in the same way that concrete decisions do. Reliance interests play
a significant role in the Supreme Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence,
reflecting the Court’s dedication to ensuring that people’s reasonable
expectations are not lightly disrupted.119 It is easy enough to see how this
reasoning applies to, say, decisions that alter the rules of property ownership
or contractual obligation.120 It is harder to apply the reasoning to interpretive
methodologies.121 Methodologies theoretically might lead to reliance by

114. See Foster, supra note 112, at 1894 (discussing the benefits of predictability); see also
Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573,
1590–91 (2014) (noting the relationship between uniform rules, consistency, and legitimacy).
115. Gluck, supra note 109, at 1851; see also Foster, supra note 112, at 1889.
116. Gluck, supra note 109, at 1852.
117. Id. at 1854; see also Foster, supra note 112, at 1887 (“Interpretive regimes further rule-oflaw values because they make the law more predictable to citizens and help to limit judicial
discretion.”).
118. See Gluck, supra note 109, at 1854 (“Litigants are entitled to expect that substantially
similar cases will be decided using the same governing legal rules and it matters—not only for
fairness perceptions but also for the development of law itself—when they aren’t.”).
119. See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015) (“So long as we
see a reasonable possibility that parties have structured their business transactions in light of [the
relevant precedent], we have one more reason to let it stand.”).
120. See id. (noting the importance of stare decisis in cases involving property or contract
rights).
121. Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron as a Canon, Not a Precedent: An
Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727,
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judges and even legislators,122 but they are more attenuated in their
connection to the discrete, individual reliance interests that have seemed so
important to the Court. Professor Gluck is surely correct that “judicial
opinions matter.”123 It is unclear, however, whether the reasoning they
contain engenders as much reliance as the rules they yield.
B.

Methodological Stare Decisis and Interpretive Choice
Even if the Supreme Court’s adoption of a uniform interpretive
methodology would enhance predictability and contribute to impersonality,
it would do so by constraining future Justices’ interpretive choices on a
cross-cutting, macro level. That impact exceeds the limits of stare decisis.124
The doctrine calls upon today’s Justices to subordinate their individual
judgments to the Court’s institutional identity. But the Justices need not go
so far as to relinquish their interpretive authority in countless future
controversies—including cases of first impression—across multiple
substantive domains.125 Such an approach would give one group of Justices
a profound power to settle matters of sweeping and systemic importance. It
also would truncate the authority of tomorrow’s Justices to reach their own
conclusions about how to interpret statutory provisions that have not
previously come before the Court.
When a Justice upholds a prior decision she would have resolved
differently as a matter of first impression, she promotes the notion of the rule
of law prevailing over the rule of individual women and men.126 Adjudication
becomes a cooperative enterprise across time,127 ensuring that legal rules
reflect more than the interpretive tendencies of today’s Justices. The interplay
between past and present gives stare decisis its force, and it also reveals the

1809 (2010) (questioning the use of reliance interests to support stare decisis for methodological
rules).
122. See id. (noting and challenging this argument).
123. Gluck, supra note 109, at 1855.
124. Whether Congress has the power to prescribe rules of statutory construction, perhaps
including a Chevron-like approach to administrative interpretations, is a separate question. For one
account, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2133–39 (2002).
125. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 156 (“While deference to precedent properly encompasses
results, rules, and frameworks, it stops short of requiring adherence to broader interpretive
philosophies. In much the same way, it would be improper to ask a justice to accept a particular
method of resolving countless statutory disputes going forward.”).
126. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 62, at 422 (“Precedent is the device by which a sequence
of cases dealing with the same problem may be called law rather than will, rules rather than
results.”).
127. See Waldron, supra note 41, at 21 (“[A judge] shares with his fellow judges . . . the
responsibility of seeing that cases that come before the court are decided on the basis of the rule of
law.”).
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limits of the doctrine. Stare decisis calls upon today’s Justices to accept some
decisions with which they disagree. That is a great deal to ask, and there is a
point beyond which the request becomes too much to bear.
A Supreme Court Justice might reasonably be expected to abide by a
rule involving, say, the application of the patent laws to royalty
agreements.128 Insisting that she accept an entire methodology of
interpretation is a different matter. Consider the position of a Justice who
takes her place on the Supreme Court and is asked to defer not simply to the
Court’s prior interpretations of specific statutes, but also to the Court’s
favored methodological approach for resolving statutory disputes—whether
that approach is textualism, purposivism, or something else. The Justice is
still faced with the prospect of subordinating her individual view to the
Court’s institutional identity, just as she is in concrete disputes. But now the
request made of her is far greater. She is urged to apply an interpretive
methodology—one she might believe to be ill-advised and deeply
problematic—to numerous future disputes across a range of contexts. This is
an extraordinary concession to seek from any Justice, and an extraordinary
power to grant the Justices who developed the relevant methodology in the
first place.129
Methodologies are not limited to a single substantive issue. They “spill
over into other areas of law.”130 Of course, even a decision interpreting a
discrete statutory provision can be wide-ranging and important.131 But
methodologies dictate interpretive choices on a broader scale.
Moreover, the exercise of interpretive choice in expounding the law is
at the heart of the judicial role.132 Allowing today’s Court to determine that
textualism or purposivism will be the required mode of interpretation going
forward confers extensive decisional authority on the precedent-setting
Justices at the expense of their successors. And it is not just any type of
authority that is transferred; it is the authority to interpret legal provisions in
light of one’s own deeply held methodological and normative principles.

128. See Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401 (2015).
129. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 154 (“Though it is reasonable to urge a justice to subordinate
her personal views within the context of particular cases, it is unreasonable (and unrealistic) to
request that she adopt, for all intents and purposes, an interpretive methodology that is not her
own.”).
130. Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 114, at 1592.
131. See id.
132. Cf. HAMBURGER, supra note 105, at 548 (arguing that during the Founding era, American
“judges had authority to expound the law, including constitutions, within their office of deciding
cases”); id. at 226 (“Defined in contrast to lawmaking, which was an exercise of will in imposing
general rules, the office of judging seemed at its core to involve the exercise of judgment in
particular cases, and these therefore became the circumstances in which judges could expound the
law, including the constitution, with the authority of their office.”).
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Methodological choices are “frequently intertwined with a judge’s most
fundamental beliefs and commitments about the rule of law and
democracy,”133 raising concerns about allowing earlier Justices to make those
decisions on behalf of later Justices on a cross-cutting basis. Today’s Justices
give presumptive respect to specific legal outcomes and to the rules that yield
them, but the doctrine of stare decisis does not justify the further step of
requiring presumptive adherence to methods that control how the interpretive
process will unfold.
Not every wide-ranging judicial rule compels an interpretive choice.
Consider the operation of abstention doctrines grounded in federalism,
comity, and the avoidance of constitutional questions.134 The standards that
govern the application of those doctrines are broad in their application, but
they do not prevail upon an individual Justice to relinquish the authority to
consult her own interpretive theory in elucidating the meaning of a contested
legal provision.
Much the same is true of the standard for granting a preliminary
injunction, which requires the assessment of factors such as the prospect of
irreparable harm and the balance of equities, but without telling future jurists
how to read disputed legal enactments.135 Or consider the Supreme Court’s
former insistence that when addressing questions of qualified immunity,
courts must determine not only whether a constitutional right was clearly
established but also whether the relevant right was violated.136 Irrespective of
whether that rule was sound, it did not require future jurists to interpret
disputed legal provisions in any particular way. Instead, it demanded that
they reveal their belief about the proper interpretation even if they also
concluded that the relevant right was not clearly established. Decisions of
this sort are broad and wide-ranging, and the Justices should be mindful of
their sweep—as well as the possibility that they might create unforeseen
problems. Even so, those doctrines avoid telling future jurists which
processes they may (and may not) use in reading the law.
Today’s Justices do not exercise unchecked power to infuse legal
propositions with presumptive force in future cases. Judges may opine on
whatever they wish, but they may opine with legal effect only on matters

133. Criddle & Staszewski, supra note 114, at 1593.
134. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 722–23 (1996) (discussing the
relationship between abstention, federalism, and comity).
135. See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
136. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (discussing, and eventually overruling,
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).
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actually before them.137 Hence the familiar distinction between binding
holdings, which involve the application of discrete legal provisions to
disputed facts, and nonbinding dicta.138 The boundary between holding and
dicta is not always clear. But the very existence of the distinction suggests
the importance of certain lines that the Justices may not cross in defining the
scope of precedent.
Those lines are based in part on the dangers inherent in trying to cover
too much, too fast. They also reflect the need for balance between past and
present. While the Court’s history is important, space for the individual
Justice must remain. There is a limit on the amount of power that should be
allocated to prior Justices at the expense of later ones. Likewise, there is a
limit on how far we can expect today’s Justices to go in subordinating their
own interpretive discretion to the Court’s institutional past. The established
practice of requiring deference to targeted expositions of the law in concrete
disputes represents an effort to protect institutional prerogatives at the
expense of interpretive autonomy, but only in a narrow and defined sphere.
Beyond these sources of conceptual tension, there are also practical
problems with characterizing interpretive methodologies as entitled to
deference. The most obvious concern is that Justices who are inclined to
accept stare decisis in a more measured form would reject the doctrine if it
carried an obligation to defer to sweeping methodological precedents. A
Justice might be willing to reaffirm a given statutory precedent decided on
textualist (or purposivist, etc.) grounds even if she is not willing to consider
herself presumptively bound by textualism (or purposivism, etc.) in all future
cases. The impact of stare decisis depends on the Justices’ acceptance of the
doctrine, and requiring deference to prior methodological choices might
strike some Justices as overreaching.139
It is worth noting that refusal to attach precedential effect to an
interpretive methodology does not change the fact that decisional rationales
are entitled to deference. The distinction is important, though it can be
slippery at times. In the constitutional context, I have argued in prior work
that it would go too far to treat as binding a process for interpreting the entire
Constitution, or even a process for resolving all future disputes involving a
provision such as the First Amendment.140 By comparison, I have argued that
the protocol for resolving more specific issues—for instance, determining
which types of speech represent categorical exceptions to First Amendment
137. See U.S. CONST. art. III § 2 (extending the judicial power to cases and controversies). For
more on the connection between Article III and the scope of judicial precedent, see KOZEL, supra
note 11, at 90–91 and Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997 (1994).
138. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 74–76.
139. See id. at 154.
140. See id.
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protection—may be entitled to deference as a decisional rationale.141 A
similar analysis applies to statutory decisions. Difficult cases will arise, to be
sure. The touchstone remains balance.
Just as the strength of precedent is not absolute, the scope of precedent
is not boundless. Legal rules that arise out of concrete disputes and are
directly tethered to specific enactments or controversies are entitled to stare
decisis effect. But interpretive methodologies that sweep across topics and
dictate fundamental interpretive choices do not warrant deference via the
doctrine of stare decisis. While a Justice should deem herself presumptively
bound to follow a given interpretation of a statutory provision, she need not
accept the methodology that yielded it. A Justice might adopt the prevailing
methodology because she finds it appealing on the merits. Yet the power to
thrust an entire methodology upon new generations of Justices is too great to
give to any iteration of the Court. Asking a Justice to embrace a sweeping
methodology represents a far greater sacrifice than asking her to accept
specific interpretations absent a special justification for overruling.
Dispensing with stare decisis for judicial interpretations of statutes
would tip the scales too far in favor of present over past and individual over
institution. But giving precedential effect to wholesale methodologies of
interpretation would move too far in the other direction.
III. Administrative Interpretations
So far I have considered two questions at the intersection of stare decisis
and statutory interpretation: How much deference should attach to judicial
interpretations of statutes? And how much deference should attach to
interpretive methodologies? In examining these questions, I have emphasized
the role of precedent in stabilizing the law and in mediating disagreements to
allow the Supreme Court to transcend the identities of its individual members
while ensuring that each Justice has room to consult her own interpretive
philosophy.142
The Executive Branch also plays a key role in the interpretive process.
Administrative agencies interpret statutes. And they interpret their own
regulations crafted in the course of carrying out their statutory directives.
Under current law, judicial review of those administrative interpretations is
marked by a substantial degree of deference.143

141. See id. at 148–49 (providing examples).
142. Cf. Barrett, supra note 2, at 1711 (noting that stare decisis sometimes “functions less to
handle doctrinal missteps than to mediate intense disagreements between justices about the
fundamental nature of the Constitution”).
143. See infra subparts III(A), (C).
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If the Supreme Court were to reconsider the amount of deference that
agency interpretations receive, what role should stare decisis play in the
analysis? Consider first the Chevron doctrine, which generally requires
upholding an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute so long as it is
reasonable.144 In 2015, Justice Thomas noted “serious questions” about the
Court’s practice of deferring to administrative interpretations of statutes.145
He worried that deference could threaten to “wrest[] from Courts the ultimate
interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is.’”146 He also described the
Court as “straying further and further from the Constitution without so much
as pausing to ask why.”147 Shortly before his retirement, Justice Kennedy
likewise stressed the need to reconsider “the premises that underlie Chevron
and how courts have implemented that decision” to ensure the preservation
of “constitutional separation-of-powers principles.”148 Notwithstanding
concerns like these, the Chevron doctrine is still in effect.149 The Court
observed just last Term that “whether Chevron should remain is a question
we may leave for another day.”150
Or consider the Auer doctrine, which generally requires upholding
agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their own regulations.151 The
defensibility of Auer, like the defensibility of Chevron, continues to be a topic
of discussion at the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in 2018 to
address the issue.152 That makes it important to ask whether the doctrine is
entitled to stare decisis effect even if a majority of Justices determine that it
is flawed on the merits.

144. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
145. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
146. Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also Henry P.
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1983) (noting the
argument that Chief Justice “Marshall’s grand conception of judicial autonomy in law declaration
was not in terms or in logic limited to constitutional interpretation, and taken at face value seemed
to condemn the now entrenched practice of judicial deference to administrative construction of
law”). But see id. at 6 (“A statement that judicial deference is mandated to an administrative
‘interpretation’ of a statute is more appropriately understood as a judicial conclusion that some
substantive law-making authority has been conferred upon the agency.”).
147. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
149. See id. at 2129 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless the Court has overruled Chevron in a secret
decision that has somehow escaped my attention, it remains good law.”).
150. SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (2018); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (raising concerns about the
Chevron approach); Walker, supra note 10, at 104 (noting “a growing call from the federal bench,
on the Hill, and within the legal academy to rethink” administrative deference doctrines).
151. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997).
152. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (granting cert.).
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In Justice Thomas’s view, the Supreme “Court has appeared to treat our
agency deference regimes as precedents entitled to stare decisis effect.”153
Professor Gluck makes the same point.154 There is some dispute here, with
William Eskridge and Connor Raso countering that in practice, the Justices
do not treat administrative-deference regimes like Chevron as binding
precedents.155
Again, my focus is on the normative question whether administrativedeference regimes ought to receive stare decisis effect. Those regimes bear
little resemblance to the specific interpretations of particular statutory
provisions discussed in Part I. Yet they do not sweep as widely as the
interpretive methodologies discussed in Part II. Chevron and Auer have an
extensive scope, but it is not nearly so broad as, say, textualism or
purposivism. As Kevin Stack explains, a Justice who attempts to follow
Chevron or Auer must still adopt some methodology of interpreting statutes
or regulations, respectively.156 Even if we are confident that judicial
interpretations of statutes warrant deference, and even if we are equally
confident that interpretive methodologies do not warrant deference,
conceptual uncertainty surrounds the precedential effect of administrativedeference regimes. Nevertheless, though issues of statutory interpretation
take on their own, unique complexion within the Executive Branch, I will
suggest that the same principles of stare decisis that inform the treatment of
judicial interpretations and broad methodologies also point the way toward
the precedential status—or lack thereof—of administrative-deference
regimes like Chevron and Auer.
A.

Generality and Interpretive Choice in Chevron
Chevron involved a dispute over the interpretation of the Clean Air
Act.157 The Supreme Court ultimately accepted the Environmental Protection
Agency’s argument about how the Act applied to pollution-emitting
devices.158
But Chevron is better known for its analytical approach than its result.
The Supreme Court described the threshold inquiry as whether Congress

153. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1214 n.1 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment).
154. See Gluck, supra note 109, at 1817 (contending that the Supreme Court applies
“methodological stare decisis” in the context of deciding when to “defer to agency interpretations
of federal statutes”).
155. Raso & Eskridge, supra note 121, at 1733–34.
156. Stack, supra note 6, at 671.
157. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
158. See id. at 866 (holding that the EPA’s definition of the term “source” was a “permissible
construction” of the Clean Air Act).
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clearly addressed the point at issue.159 Where the answer is yes, Congress’s
instructions are dispositive. Where the answer is no, a court must ask whether
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable—not whether it reflects the best
reading of the statute in question.160 Administrative interpretations of statutes
don’t need to be right; they just can’t be clearly wrong.161
The Chevron Court cast its approach as a reflection of congressional
intent, based on the assumption that when Congress does not clearly resolve
an issue, it likely intends for an administrative agency (rather than a court) to
fill the gap.162 That argument can be understood as inferring a delegation on
the part of Congress to the relevant agency—a delegation that might be based
on the expertise that agencies possess163 or their political responsiveness.164
The Chevron Court also appealed to precedent, drawing on the Court’s prior
cases involving Executive Branch interpretations.165
As noted above, there is some basis for believing that the Supreme Court
views Chevron as warranting stare decisis effect, even though the Court has
not engaged in much discussion of the matter. If this is indeed the Court’s
position, one possible explanation is that on the continuum between specific
interpretations and general methodologies, Chevron is closer to the former
than the latter. On that understanding, it makes perfect sense that Chevron
would receive deference as something akin to a targeted doctrinal framework
but short of a full-blown interpretive theory.166 The Court commonly treats
doctrinal frameworks with what appears to be precedential effect, for
example by taking as given the multipart analysis for certain statutory

159. Id. at 842.
160. See, e.g., City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 296 (2013) (“Chevron is rooted in a
background presumption of congressional intent.”). Daniel Hemel and Aaron Nielson argue that
there exists an intermediate step, not directly relevant to the analysis here, whereby some courts ask
“whether the agency itself recognized that it was dealing with an ambiguous statute.” Daniel J.
Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 760 (2017).
161. See, e.g., Caleb E. Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1, 6 (2001).
162. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
163. See id.
164. See id. As Peter Strauss notes, other potential justifications for the Chevron approach
include the uniformity that arises from centralizing interpretive authority in a single agency rather
than scores of federal courts. See Strauss, supra note 10, at 1121; VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 208. Richard Pierce adds more potential grounds for justifying
Chevron, including “defin[ing] the constitutionally permissible place of agencies in government,”
among others. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225,
2229 (1997).
165. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
166. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 76–80, 146 (discussing the precedential effect of doctrinal
frameworks).
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hostile-work-environment claims167 and the strict scrutiny analysis for
content-based restrictions on speech.168 Chevron could be viewed in the same
way.
Yet there is an important distinction. It turns on whether a precedent
deals with a discrete statute or rather applies across a wide range of
provisions. Particular interpretations of the Clean Air Act, the Sherman Act,
and the Patent Act are confined to limited substantive domains. By requiring
deference to those interpretations, the doctrine of stare decisis promotes legal
continuity while leaving room for today’s Justices to apply their own
interpretive methodologies to other statutes. By contrast, Chevron is not
limited to any substantive context; it is wide-ranging and cross-cutting.
It is not always easy to draw the line between doctrinal frameworks that
warrant deference and interpretive methodologies that do not.169 And it is
certainly true that precedents can be defined at different degrees of generality.
We could call a decision a statutory precedent, or a Sherman Act precedent,
or a “resale price maintenance” precedent,170 and so on. But the presence of
some complexity does not change what is clear about Chevron: given the
Chevron regime’s capacious scope and trans-substantive sweep, infusing it
with stare decisis effect would dictate (presumptively) the interpretive
approach that future Justices must adopt in countless cases involving a wide
range of statutes and agencies.
There is more to the story than simply breadth. As noted in Part II, courts
commonly rely on broad rules to bring predictability and consistency to their
operations, and for now I am leaving open the possibility that some such rules
may be entitled to stare decisis effect. The crucial feature of Chevron, which
is likewise characteristic of interpretive methodologies, is the combination of
cross-cutting rules with impositions on judicial authority to interpret the law.
Like methodologies such as textualism or purposivism, Chevron dictates an
interpretive choice.171 The doctrine is founded on the premise that when
Congress leaves an ambiguity in a statute, judges must interpret that

167. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); see also Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional
Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859, 868 (2012)
(noting the Supreme Court’s creation of a multipart test to govern harassment claims).
168. See KOZEL, supra note 11, at 146.
169. Cf. Chad M. Oldfather, Methodological Stare Decisis and Constitutional Interpretation
(noting that the “familiar tiered-scrutiny framework” could be described as a methodology), in
PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, supra note 36, at 135, 147.
170. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
171. Cf. Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV.
937, 942 (2018) (“[W]hen a court interprets an administrative statute, finds it to be ambiguous, and
defers to an agency’s reasonable construction of the statute, the court is fully exercising its power
and duty to interpret the statute . . . .”).
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ambiguity as an implicit “legislative delegation to an agency,” such that a
reviewing court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator.”172 The
interpretive choice is made as a categorical matter, disconnected from the
facts and context of any particular dispute. That brings Chevron close enough
to the status of an interpretive methodology to deny it stare decisis effect.
The law of precedent contemplates the constraint of interpretive choice
in a more targeted fashion, as reflected in the conventional distinction
between binding holdings and dispensable dicta.173 So long as Chevron is
understood as defining interpretive processes on a macro, cross-cutting level,
it should rise or fall on its merits.174
None of the foregoing suggests that Chevron should be abandoned.
Maybe the Justices are well served to abide by Chevron because it is correct.
I take no position on such possibilities, save to note that respect for precedent
is but one component of the judicial duty.
B.

Reimagining Chevron
What if Chevron were reconceptualized? What if, for instance, the
Supreme Court had expressly adopted the doctrine as a standard of review
for invalidating executive action?175 Or as a remedial scheme that allows
today’s Justices to interpret statutes in light of their own methodological
preferences but limits the situations in which relief can be granted?176 Or as
a judicial voting rule requiring a supermajority vote in order to reject an
agency’s proffered interpretation?177
172. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see also
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss,
Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611, 615–16 (2009) (noting that an administrative
interpretation may be permissible under Chevron because it “falls within the scope of agency
discretion that is accorded by statutory ambiguity”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too
Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1143, 1145 (2012) (describing the application of Chevron as based on “a finding of law that
Congress has validly allocated authority to a noncourt body”).
173. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “holding” as “[a] court’s
determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision,” and “obiter dictum” as “[a] judicial
comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the
case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive)”).
174. Cf. HAMBURGER, supra note 8, at 52 (noting that “[a]t common law,” judges’ office
“required them to discern and expound the law in cases, and although this was not all they did, it
increasingly seemed the core of their office”). This understanding, Professor Hamburger concludes,
was preserved by the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 316.
175. Cf. Stack, supra note 6, at 671 (describing Chevron and Auer as operating like standards
of review).
176. See generally F. Andrew Hessick, Remedial Chevron, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2018).
177. See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE
L.J. 676 (2007).
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In circumstances like these, it is possible that the stare decisis effect of
Chevron might be different. That is, there may be ways to implement
something like the Chevron approach without dictating future Justices’
interpretive choices. If that enterprise were successful—and if the measures
of pursuing it were lawful, which is a matter on which I express no opinion—
Chevron might be converted from something like a rule of interpretation into
a rule of judicial administration. Such a reformulated rule might arguably
warrant stare decisis effect if it avoided intruding on the province of future
Justices’ interpretive choices.
In its current formulation, however, the Chevron rule tells future Justices
how to read scores of statutes based on categorical assumptions about what
Congress meant. That is too much to demand of Justices with their own
philosophies of interpretation.
C.

Generality and Interpretive Choice in Auer
The foregoing analysis applies in large measure to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Auer,178 another hot topic in recent debates about the future of
administrative law. As a legal doctrine, Auer speaks to the interpretation of
regulations that agencies craft in carrying out their statutory duties. As an
actual case, Auer dealt with uncertainty about exemptions from overtime pay
under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Among the questions before the Court
was whether the Secretary of Labor had lawfully interpreted regulations for
determining exempt status. Relying on its earlier decision in Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,179 the Court reasoned that an agency head’s
interpretation must control unless it is plainly incorrect or inconsistent with
the relevant regulation.180
One explanation for the Auer regime is that expert agencies possess
“special insight” into the meaning of regulations they crafted.181 Understood
in this way, Auer dictates the interpretive inferences that future Justices must
draw. Even if they think a regulation is best understood as carrying a
particular meaning, the Justices presumptively must conclude—so long as
the regulation is unclear, and so long as the agency’s interpretation is within
reason—that their reading is actually incorrect. The special-insight rationale
reflects the belief that the agency’s interpretation must govern “even when
other indicia (including the text) tend to point in another direction.”182 If
178. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
179. 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
180. See Auer, 519 U.S. at 461.
181. E.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 618 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1454 (2011).
182. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 181, at 1454.
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today’s Justice disagrees with the agency’s reading, she must reconcile
herself with the fact that she is mistaken. The effect of Auer, like the effect
of Chevron, is to dictate an interpretive choice across a range of cases and
contexts.
A second justification for Auer deference is that it ensures the agency’s
authority to interpret ambiguous regulations as informed by its own
pragmatic and policy judgments.183 Such authority, the argument runs,
ultimately traces back to a congressional choice: “[T]he power
authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a component of the agency’s
delegated lawmaking powers.”184 This rationale dictates another interpretive
choice: future Justices must accept a particular assumption about what
Congress intended to do. Again, to dictate this choice on a cross-cutting,
macro level is to exceed the limits of stare decisis. One iteration of the
Supreme Court can tell another how to read a particular statute or regulation.
What it cannot do is insist upon the interpretive inferences that future Justices
must draw in construing statutes and regulations that the Court has never
engaged. In transgressing that limit, Auer puts itself beyond the purview of
stare decisis—though I hasten to add that this analysis does not speak to
whether Auer ought to be retained on the merits, nor does it resolve the
question whether Auer could be reformulated to avoid intruding on the
province of interpretive choice.185
D.

The Role of Congressional Intent
I have been analyzing Chevron and Auer essentially as common-law
doctrines rather than applications of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). Auer did not tether its analysis to the APA, and its predecessor case,
Seminole Rock, was decided before the APA was enacted. Nor did the
Chevron Court frame its inquiry as flowing from the APA. Hence Justice
Scalia’s statement in 2015 that Chevron and Auer are “[h]eedless of the
original design of the APA.”186

183. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Pauley v.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697 (1991).
184. Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991); see
also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 181, at 1457 (noting the “presumption that when Congress
delegated the agency the authority to make rules with the force of law, it implicitly delegated to the
agency the authority to clarify those rules with subsequent (reasonable) interpretations . . . .”).
185. See supra subpart III(B) (discussing the possible stare decisis implications of
reconceptualizing Chevron).
186. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation,
126 YALE L.J. 908, 918 (2017) (arguing that the “APA’s text, drafting history, and early scholarly
interpretations all . . . suggest that Congress sought to cabin the discretion that the [Supreme] Court
had recently granted administrative agencies”); Siegel, supra note 171, at 985 (observing that § 706
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The stare decisis analysis might be different if Chevron and Auer had
emerged from a deep dive into the APA’s meaning. Suppose that in those two
cases, the Supreme Court had read the APA as instructing that in the face of
statutory ambiguity, administrative interpretations must be upheld so long as
they are reasonable. The Court’s decisions certainly would be applied to
future cases involving the provision of the Clean Air Act at issue in Chevron
and to the labor regulation at issue in Auer. They might also go further. If we
assume that the Court can issue wide-ranging precedential decisions in the
course of interpreting a legislative enactment that Congress intended to be
cross-cutting, there is an argument that Chevron and Auer would be entitled
to deference had they emerged from a deliberate engagement with the APA.
That scenario, though, is hypothetical. Whatever the precise origins of
Chevron and Auer,187 they do not reflect a careful parsing of the APA.188
E.

Deference Doctrines Versus Specific Applications
Even if Chevron and Auer do not warrant stare decisis effect for their
respective deference regimes, there remains the question of how to treat
particular applications of those doctrines. In Chevron, the Supreme Court did
more than articulate an interpretive approach; it also ruled that the EPA’s
reading of the relevant statute was lawful.189 Likewise, the Court concluded
in Auer that the Secretary of Labor’s reading of certain regulations involving
overtime pay was lawful.190 The status of those rulings presents a separate
issue for purposes of stare decisis.
A judicial decision upholding an agency’s interpretation of a statute
governing air pollution or a regulation governing employee wages reflects
the targeted application of law to fact within the confines of a concrete
dispute. Whether or not the interpretive approaches of Chevron and Auer are
retained, specific applications of those doctrines do not raise concerns about
taking interpretive choices away from future Justices on a macro level.
Accordingly, a judicial finding that a particular administrative interpretation
is lawful should be entitled to stare decisis effect regardless of whether the
analytical approaches of Chevron and Auer are reconsidered.
of the APA is “suggestive of a de novo standard,” even if not “completely inconsistent with
deferential review”).
187. E.g., VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 9, at 208 (“[C]andid
observers, on all sides, acknowledge that Congress has not authoritatively required or forbidden the
Chevron principle.”); Bamzai, supra note 186, at 987 (“[W]hen Congress enacted the APA . . . [i]t
did not . . . incorporate the rule that came to be known as Chevron deference . . . .”).
188. E.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There
is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . ,
which it did not even bother to cite.”).
189. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984).
190. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
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In applying Chevron, for example, the Supreme Court might conclude
that a given interpretation “follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”191 Under those
circumstances, there would be no basis for denying stare decisis effect to the
Court’s decision. The more difficult question is how to handle decisions that
reflect the other teaching of Chevron and Auer: in the face of ambiguity, the
Court may deem an agency’s interpretation to be reasonable without going
further to declare it the best available reading. In such cases, one might
contend that a renewed challenge to the agency’s determination should
proceed irrespective of the doctrine of stare decisis, because the Court has
never determined what the relevant statute or regulation really means. In a
post-Chevron and post-Auer world, the argument goes, the Court would
simply be asked to interpret—to truly interpret—the statute or regulation for
the first time.192
This position, I submit, reflects an unduly narrow vision of the role of
precedent in federal adjudication. When the Supreme Court deems an
agency’s reading of a statute or regulation to fall within the bounds of
permissible discretion, the Court establishes the lawfulness of the agency’s
interpretation. A subsequent challenge to that interpretation necessarily takes
issue with the Court’s prior ruling. It is certainly possible to argue that
something the Court previously treated as lawful is, in fact, unlawful. But
such arguments implicate the doctrine of stare decisis by seeking to alter the
adjudicated validity of legal rules. The Court has noted that “[p]rinciples of
stare decisis . . . demand respect for precedent whether judicial methods of
interpretation change or stay the same.”193 The same goes for changing
perspectives on the amount of deference to which administrative
interpretations are entitled.194 Concrete applications of Chevron and Auer
191. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
192. This analysis proceeds in the same fashion regardless of whether Chevron is understood
as setting forth two discrete, sequential steps or rather a single inquiry into “whether the agency’s
construction is permissible as a matter of statutory interpretation.” Matthew C. Stephenson &
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597, 599 (2009).
193. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); cf. United States v. Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 489 (2012) (“It may be that judges today would use other
methods to determine whether Congress left a gap to fill. But that is beside the point.”).
194. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of an administrative interpretation as reasonable does
not preclude a fresh look by the agency itself. For example, if the Court has upheld an administrative
interpretation without declaring a statute’s clear meaning, the agency may change its position
without facing heightened scrutiny. Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514
(2009) (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement
that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”). For an argument challenging this
approach as applied to agency reversals that are grounded in interpretive judgments as opposed to
policy judgments, see generally Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change,
59 UCLA L. REV. 112 (2011). In all events, under existing law a judicial determination that an
administrative interpretation is reasonable “does not ‘fix’ the meaning of the statute in any definitive
sense” with respect to the agency. GARY LAWSON, EVIDENCE OF THE LAW 131 (2017).
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carry a presumption of durability independent of the decision-making
approaches that yielded them.
Conclusion
The distinction between statutory and constitutional precedents is
prominent in the Supreme Court’s discussions of stare decisis. This Article
has emphasized a different distinction, grounded in a judicial proposition’s
scope rather than its statutory or constitutional genesis. I have argued that
specific judicial interpretations are entitled to deference, but that general
methodologies do not warrant stare decisis effect. As for administrativedeference regimes such as Chevron and Auer, I have suggested that so long
as those regimes are framed as dictating interpretive choices across a wide
range of cases and contexts, they exceed the limits of stare decisis.
Throughout the Article, I have emphasized the role of precedent in
balancing the tension between past and present. Fidelity to precedent helps
to make the Supreme Court more than the sum of its parts. Even so, those
parts—that is, the Justices who have gone through the nomination and
confirmation process based on their individual attributes and
accomplishments—must have space to bring their own philosophies to bear.
There are no easy answers here, but there is a clear aspiration: being true to
one’s foundational interpretive commitments while respecting the institution
to which one belongs.

